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We consider the integrated optimization problem of procurement, processing and trade of commodities over
a network in a multiperiod setting. Motivated by the operations of a prominent commodity processing firm,
we model a firm that operates a star network with multiple locations at which it can procure an input
commodity and has processing capacity at a central location to convert the input into a processed commodity.
The processed commodity is sold using forward contracts, while the input itself can be traded at the end
of the horizon. We show that the single-node version of this problem can be solved optimally when the
procurement cost for the input is piecewise linear and convex, and derive closed form expressions for the
marginal value of input and output inventory. However, these marginal values are hard to compute because of
high dimensionality of the state space and we develop an efficient heuristic to compute approximate marginal
values. We also show that the star network problem can be approximated as an equivalent single node
problem and propose heuristics for solving the network problem. We conduct numerical studies to evaluate
the performance of both the single node and network heuristics. We find that the single node heuristics
are near-optimal, capturing close to 90% of the value of an upper bound on the optimal expected profits.
Approximating the star network by a single node is effective, with the gap between the heuristic and upper
bound ranging from 7% to 14% for longer planning horizons.
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1. Introduction
The motivation for our work comes from the innovative practices of one of India’s largest pri-
vate sector companies, The ITC Group (www.itcportal.com). The International Business Division
(IBD) of ITC, started in 1990, exports agricultural commodities such as soybean meal, rice, wheat
and wheat products, lentils, shrimp, fruit pulps, and coffee. Increased competition, along with an
1
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inefficient farm-to-market supply chain made it imperative for ITC-IBD to re-engineer the pro-
curement process for commodities in rural India. Specifically, in the year 2000 ITC-IBD (hereafter
referred to as ITC) embarked on the e-Choupal initiative to deploy information and communication
technology (ICT) to reengineer the procurement of commodities from rural India. By purchasing
directly from the farmers, and not just the local spot markets, ITC significantly improved the
efficiency of the channel and created value for both the farmer and itself. The initiative has been
hailed as an outstanding example of the use of ICT by a private enterprise to streamline supply
chains, alleviate poverty and bring about social transformation. The e-Choupal platform has been
extremely successful for ITC and has been well documented by Prahalad (2005) and Anupindi and
Sivakumar (2006).
The e-Choupal platform for commodity procurement consists of a hub-and-spoke network where
spokes correspond to village level ICT kiosks (called e-Choupals) consisting of a personal com-
puter with internet access and the hubs are procurement centers or processing plants where direct
deliveries occur (called the direct-channel). ITC creates a one-day forward market for procurement
of commodities by announcing an offered price at each of its hubs. Typically, the forward price
offered for the next period is the realized spot price in the current period. Farmers can access the
e-Choupal kiosks for various information including ITC’s prices, but have the option to sell their
produce in the local spot market or directly to ITC at their hub location. One of the benefits to
the farmers of selling directly to ITC is that the farmers are guaranteed same day service, which
is not usually the case when they sell in the spot market. In order to satisfy the same day service
guarantee, ITC places an upper limit on the total quantity that it will purchase through the direct
channel in any period. In addition to the direct channel, ITC can also procure in the local spot
market, if necessary. By 2007, there were close to 6000 e-Choupals and 140 procurement hubs in the
network, with soybean being one of the largest commodities procured by ITC using the e-Choupal
network. A schematic of the eChoupal network for soybean is shown in Figure 1.
Close to seventy percent of the soybean procured is processed at several processing plants; the
rest is traded. Beans are processed to produce soybean oil and soybean meal, both of which are
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Figure 1 ITC e-Choupal Network.
traded through various channels. Managing this network requires decisions regarding procurement
and trading of different commodities to maximize profits. Procurement decisions, which include
price and quantity decisions for each hub, need to be integrated with the sales decision in terms
of the form of output commodity and channels to trade in; that is, for the soybean procured,
ITC needs to make decisions regarding whether to trade the bean or process it and trade the oil
and meal. Trade options for the various commodities include trading in open markets and with
other processors. We wish to determine the optimal policy for managing a commodity storage and
processing network such as the e-Choupal network. Specifically, we are interested in the relationship
between procurement, processing and trade decisions for the various commodities and the impact
of operational constraints such as procurement and processing capacities on these decisions. While
ITC’s operations provide the basic context for our research, the problem considered in this paper is
applicable in a more general context to firms in the commodities processing business. Profits for such
firms is affected by both input and output commodity prices in globally traded exchanges and local
spot markets. The procurement, processing and trade decisions for such firms are interdependent
because of operational constraints and ignoring these dependencies can result in significant loss of
value.
We consider a multiperiod optimization problem, in which a firm procures an input commodity
across multiple locations, with the marginal cost of procurement dependent on prices realized in
spot markets for the commodity. The firm earns revenues by processing the input commodity at
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a central processing location and committing to sell the processed output using forward contracts
in every period. In addition, the firm can also trade the input inventory with other processors
at the end of the horizon. In the single node version of this problem, we show that there exist
two inventory and price dependent thresholds such that it is optimal to process up to capacity
if the expected revenue from trading the output commodity is greater than the higher threshold.
Similarly, it is optimal to procure the input commodity up to capacity if the spot price is less than
the lower threshold. For values in between the two thresholds, the procurement and processing
quantities are interdependent, but can be quantified. We derive recursive expressions to determine
these thresholds in closed form when the procurement cost is linear or piecewise linear and con-
vex. These expressions can be computed efficiently when a single forward contract is available to
trade the output commodity over the entire planning horizon. However, when multiple forwards
with different maturities are available to sell the output, these expressions are computationally
intractable because of the high dimensionality of the state space required to model the dynamics of
the various price processes. We develop efficient heuristics to compute approximate values of these
thresholds and near-optimal policies. We analyze the network problem when the firm operates a
star network; i.e., a network with a central processing and trade location connected to multiple
procurement locations. We show that the star network problem is equivalent to the single node
problem with convex cost of procurement when the transshipment costs between the nodes is negli-
gible compared to the commodity prices and develop a heuristic to solve the network problem. Our
numerical studies show that the heuristics for the single node and network problem perform quite
well, capturing more than 90% of the value of an upper bound on the optimal expected profits in
many cases.
The problem considered in this paper is related to the warehouse management problem studied
by Bellman (1956) and Dreyfus (1957), and later extended by Charnes et al. (1966). The warehouse
problem is one of determining the optimal trading policy for a commodity with constraints on
the total inventory of the commodity that can be stored. Charnes et al. (1966) show that the
value function is linear in the starting inventory level and derive expressions for the marginal
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value of inventory. These papers, however, do not consider constraints on the procurement and
sales; i.e., it is assumed that any desired quantity of the commodity can be procured or sold in a
period. More recently, Secomandi (2009b) considers a similar problem in the context of managing
a natural gas storage asset. In addition to storage constraints, the paper also incorporates injection
and withdrawal constraints and establishes the optimality of a price dependent double base-stock
policy. While there are similarities, the problem addressed in the current paper has some significant
differences, namely: a) we consider multiple commodities, in contrast to the single commodity
trading decisions addressed in the warehouse management problem, b) in addition to procurement
and trade of commodities, we also consider the additional decision of irreversibly transforming
some of the commodities and c) our analysis includes operations over a network.
The single node problem considered here has similarities to the firm level production and inven-
tory control problem studied in Wu and Chen (2009) for a storable input-output commodity pair.
While Wu and Chen (2009) consider the optimal procurement and sales policy for the individ-
ual firm, their main focus is on analyzing the propagation of demand and supply shocks across
production stages and the price-inventory relationship across input-output commodities using a
rational expectations equilibrium model. Routledge et al. (2001) also consider a multi-commodity
processing and storage network, but focus on deriving a rational expectations equilibrium model
that can be used to extend the theory of storage to non-storable commodities like electricity and
explain some of the empirically observed features of electricity prices. In contrast, we are interested
in characterizing the optimal policy and deriving managerial insights for a firm operating a com-
modity processing business. As such, we do not adopt an equilibrium approach and instead model
the evolution of the various commodity prices as exogenously given.
The procurement, processing and trade decisions considered in this paper are related to the
valuation of real options. In the current problem, a unit of output inventory can be committed
for sale against any of the forward contracts that are yet to expire. Thus, the marginal value of a
unit of output in any period is similar to valuing a compound exchange option (cf. Carr (1988))
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with the underlying assets being the various forward prices. While not the focus, the heuristics we
develop in this paper can be used to approximate the value of such compound exchange options.
The concept of spread options is also closely related to the problem considered here, especially
the processing decision. Spread options are call or put options on the spread between the prices
of two commodities and arise naturally in the context of commodity industries. The valuation of
spread options has typically been considered in single period setting; i.e., the valuation of a spread
option with specific maturity date or situations where the exercise of the spread option maturing on
one date does not affect the value or optimal exercise policy of a spread option maturing at a later
date. Geman (2005) provides a discussion of different spread options in the commodity industries;
e.g., crush spreads for agricultural commodities (soybean, for instance), crack spread (crude oil and
refined petroleum products), location spreads (natural gas prices at different locations), calendar
spreads (difference in natural gas forward prices for different maturities). Secomandi (2009a) con-
siders the valuation of pipeline capacity used to transport natural gas across two locations using
spread option valuation models on the spread between the natural gas prices at the two locations.
Similarly, Deng et al. (2001) use spark spread options on the spread between electricity and gen-
erating fuel prices and location spread options on the spread between electricity prices at different
locations to value generation and transmission assets. In a closely related context, Plato (2001)
examines the decision of US soybean processors to commit processing capacity to crush soybeans
and produce soybean meal and oil. This decision is similar to the exercise of a spread option on the
gross processing margin at a future date, i.e., the spread between the futures price of soybean meal
and oil and soybean, with the exercise price being equal to the variable cost of processing. In this
paper, the decision to process a unit of input is akin to exercising a spread option on the difference
between the values of a unit of output and input, with the processing cost as the exercise price.
Processing (and procurement) decisions across periods are, however, linked through the storage of
input inventory and operational capacity constraints. This crucial difference makes the processing
decision considered here different from the exercise of a simple spread option considered in the
extant literature.
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The star network analyzed in this paper is based on the features of the e-Choupal network
with different procurement hubs serving a single processing plant that also has an associated
procurement facility. While more complex commodity production and distribution networks have
been considered in literature, (cf., Markland (1975), Markland and Newett (1976)), these papers
assume deterministic commodity prices and have no capacity constraints. In contrast, we consider
stochastic commodity prices and capacity constraints on procurement and processing which make
the problem non-trivial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we solve the integrated procurement,
processing and trade decisions for a risk-neutral firm operating a single node. We solve the single
node problem completely and obtain expressions for the marginal value of inventory. Section 2.1
presents the analysis for the linear procurement cost case, while Section 2.2 describes the convex,
piecewise linear procurement cost situation. We describe computation of the optimal policy when
a single forward contract is available to make output sale commitments and develop computation-
ally tractable heuristics for the more general case with multiple forward contracts with different
maturities in Section 2.3.1. We provide numerical examples of the computations in Section 2.4. We
analyze the network problem in Section 3 and develop heuristics to solve the star network problem
in Section 3.1. Section 4 concludes the paper with directions for future research.
2. The Single Node Problem
2.1. Linear Procurement Cost
We consider a finite horizon problem with the time periods indexed by n = 1,2, . . . ,N −1,N where
n = 1 is the first decision period. In any period n, let Sn denote the price for the input in the
spot market. The procurement season for the input commodity may span multiple output forward
maturities. For instance, the soybean meal and oil forward contracts traded on the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange (CME) have maturity months of January, March, May, July, August, September,
October and December - implying multiple forward contracts expiring during the procurement
season (September–March/April). We consider L forward contracts available for selling the output
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during the planning horizon. The forward contracts are indexed by `, with ` ∈ {1,2, . . . ,L} and
maturity N`. We assume N` − 1 is the last possible period in which the firm can sell the output
using forward contract `. Without loss of generality, we assume N` < N`+1 for all ` < L. Let F `n
denote the period n forward price on contract `, for n < N` ≤N . The firm sells all the output using
forward contracts. In addition, the firm can also trade the input itself with other processors over
the horizon. For ease of exposition, we assume that all, if any, input sales happen at the end of the
horizon with a per-unit trade (or salvage) value of SN . Agricultural commodities exhibit season-
ality with increased supply soon after harvest periods. With enough supply available, bulk of the
processors’ procurement from spot markets happen during this period, termed the ‘procurement
season’. Trade between processors is typically low during these periods. In our context, the plan-
ning horizon can be considered as the procurement season, when bulk of the procurement happens.
End of the horizon can be thought of representing the off-season, when most of the trading of the
input (soybean) between processing firms happens.
Due to physical or other operational limitations, the firm has a per-period procurement capacity
restriction of K units and a processing capacity of C units per period to convert the input into a
processed product (also referred to as ‘output’). The unit cost of processing one unit of the input
commodity into the output commodity is p. The firm incurs a per period holding cost of hI and
hO per unit of input and output inventory respectively. We assume hO ≥ hI . Initially, we consider
a linear cost of procurement, i.e., the cost of procuring x units of input is equal to Sn × x when
the input spot price is equal to Sn. Later, in Section 2.2, we extend the analysis to include convex,
piecewise linear cost of procurement.
The relevant information available to the firm at the beginning of period n regarding the spot
market prices, output forward prices and trade prices for the input is given by In and all expec-
tations are taken under the risk-neutral measure. We assume interest rates are constant and there
is no counter-party risk associated with the forward contracts. As a result, the discount factor per
period, β, is the risk-free discount factor. It is a well known result that under these conditions,
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the forward prices for the output are a martingale process (see Hull (1997), Section 3.9 or Bjork
(2004), Section 7.6 for details). We thus have
EIn [F `n+1] = F `n for n < N`, ∀ ` (1)
where EIn [·] denotes expectation, conditional on In.
The variable In can include the realized spot market price, forward prices and other state vari-
ables which impact the commodity prices; e.g., aggregate inventory levels of the commodities. Our
formulation of the integrated procurement, processing and trade problem does not depend on the
specific model used to represent the dynamics of the various input and output prices.
In each time period n≤N−1, the firm makes the following sequence of decisions: a) the quantity
of the input commodity to be procured: xn, b) the quantity of the output commodity to be
committed for sale against forward contract ` in period n: q`n for all ` such that N` > n and c)
the quantity of input to be processed into output in period n: mn. In the last period, N , the
firm trades any remaining input inventory. Optimal values of these decisions will be denoted by
a ‘*’ superscript. Let Qn (respectively, en) denote the total output (respectively, input) inventory
available at the beginning of period n.
It is easy to see that in any given period it is optimal to commit against at most one forward
contract. Thus, let ˆ̀ be the forward contract that the firm commits against in period n, if a
commitment is made. Notice that the firm can potentially commit to sell more output than is
currently available; i.e., ‘over-commit’ such that q ˆ̀n > Qn +mn. This is possible because the output
needs to be delivered only in period Nˆ̀ and the firm can process in some future period(s) t between
n and Nˆ̀ to meet the shortfall q
ˆ̀
n − (Qn + mn), which would require that we keep track of the
shortfall against each forward contract. However, in light of the martingale property (equation (1)),
we can see that such a ‘anticipatory commitment’ strategy would never be optimal and thus the
firm will never over-commit. Therefore, we do not need to keep track of the shortfall against each
forward contract and (en,Qn,In) is sufficient to describe the state of the system at the beginning
of period n. Further, because commitments once made cannot be reversed, we can recognize the
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revenues associated with output sales at the time of making the commitment rather than at the
time of delivery without loss of generality. Thus, if a commitment is made in period n, it would








where the term inside
the parenthesis is the discounted forward price minus the total discounted holding costs incurred
from the current period till delivery at the maturity of the foward contract. We can formulate the















−Snxn− pmn−hI [en +xn−mn]




for n < N and
VN(eN ,QN ,IN) =
{
SNeN eN ≥ 0
−∞ otherwise (3)
where the state transition equations are given by
en+1 = en +xn−mn (4)
Qn+1 = Qn +mn− q ˆ̀n (5)
The constraints on xn and mn in equation (2) are capacity and input availability constraints. The
constraint on the commitment quantity is the no ‘over-commitment’ condition, which is without
loss of optimality and ensures (en,Qn,In) is sufficient to describe the state of the system.







each unit committed for sale. The firm can earn the same expected revenue (discounted to period
n dollars) by postponing the commitment to period Nˆ̀−1, the last opportunity to commit against
contract ˆ̀. By postponing the decision to period Nˆ̀−1, the firm retains the option to not commit
the unit of output to contract ˆ̀ if some other contract `′ provides a higher revenue. Extending this
argument, we have the following result.
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Lemma 1. It is optimal to commit to sell output using contract `, for ` = 1,2, . . . ,L, only in period
N` − 1 and only if F `N`−1 is at least as much as the expected benefit from committing against the
remaining L− l contracts. Let Φ(`)N`−1 denote the marginal value of output inventory in period N`−1,

















if ` < L
(6)
and the optimal commitment quantity against contract ` is given by
q`∗N`−1 =
{




To gain further intuition about Φ(`)N`−1, consider the case when there are only two forward con-
tracts available for selling the output, with maturities N1 and N2 respectively. In period N1 − 1,
the firm will commit the available output inventory for sale against contract 1, if doing so provides
higher revenue and not otherwise. Thus, the value of a unit of output inventory in period N1−1 is
equal to max
{





. This value is simply the payoff from
an exchange option on the two discounted forward prices, after adjusting for holding costs. Equa-
tion (6) generalizes this to the case when there are L contracts available to commit the output
against. At the maturity of contract `, the value of a unit of output is equal to the maximum of
the revenue from contract ` and the maximum expected benefit from committing against one of
the remaining L− ` contracts at a later date.
Notice that the optimal commitment policy is an ‘all or nothing’ policy; i.e., if it is optimal to
commit against contract ` in period N`− 1, then it is optimal to commit all the available output
inventory, QN`−1 +mN`−1. Using an induction argument and the result in Lemma 1, we can prove
the following result.
Lemma 2. The value function Vn(en,Qn,In) is separable in en and Qn, and is linear in Qn. The












if N`−1 ≤ n < N` for ` = 1,2, . . . ,L
0 if n≥NL
(7)
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The fact that there are no capacity constraints on the output sale commitments ensures the
value function is linear in Qn. We can write
Vn(en,Qn,In) = ∆nQn +Un(en,In) for n < N and (8)
VN(eN ,QN ,IN) = UN(eN ,IN) (9)






[∆n− p]mn−Snxn−hI [en +xn−mn]
+βEIn [Un+1(en+1,In+1)]
}
for n < N (10)
and
UN(eN ,IN) = SNeN (11)
Notice that in any period n < N`− 1, the marginal value of a unit of output inventory is equal
to the expected discounted payoff from the optimal commitment decision in period N` − 1, after
adjusting for holding costs. The payoff from optimal commitment in period N`− 1 is nothing but
the payoff of a compound exchange option on the remaining L− ` + 1 forward contracts; i.e., an
option to exchange revenue from the immediately maturing forward contract ` for a compound
exchange option on the remaining L− ` forward contracts, after adjusting for holding costs. Thus,
each unit of output inventory can be considered a compound exchange option, with the remaining
forward contracts as the underlying assets (cf., Carr (1988)).
We next turn to determining the marginal value of input inventory. If the firm had infinite
processing capacity, we can use very similar arguments and show that it would be optimal for the
firm to process, if at all, only in periods N`−1. Further, the processing and commitment quantities
would be equal to each other and equal eN`−1 +xN`−1, the total available input inventory. In such a
situation, the marginal value of input inventory would be equal to the value of a compound exchange
option, where the underlying assets of the option include remaining forward contracts net of the
processing cost p and the input trade price at the end of horizon, after adjusting for holding costs.
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However, the firm does not have infinite processing capacity and cannot afford to limit processing
only to periods N`−1. Thus, the true marginal value of input inventory would be less than the value
of such a compound exchange option. Further, the value of a unit of input inventory would depend
on the total input inventory available. For instance, when the input inventory at the beginning of
period n is more than the remaining processing capacity till maturity of the last forward contract




discounted expected salvage value net of total discounted holding costs, irrespective of the value
from processing ∆n− p. We now derive expressions for the marginal value of input inventory that
facilitates evaluation of the decision to process in period n.
To this end, let D be the largest value such that the processing capacity C = aD and the
procurement capacity K = bD, where a and b are positive integers; i.e., D is the greatest common
divisor of C and K.1 Theorem 1 below states that Un(en,In) is piecewise linear, with breaks at
integral multiples of D and provides an expression for Θkn, the marginal value of input inventory
at the beginning of period n, when en ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD), where k is a positive integer. (While Θkn
clearly depends on the realization of In for all n and k, for notational convenience, we do not show
this dependence explicitly.)
Theorem 1. The value function Un(en,In) is continuous, concave and piecewise linear in en with
changes in slope at integral multiples of D, for each realization of In. Let Θkn denote the marginal
value of input inventory (i.e., slope of Un) at the beginning of period n, when en ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD)
where k is an integer.
For all n, let Θkn ,∞ for k≤ 0. In the last period, ΘkN = SN for all k≥ 1. For any period n < N








where Ω(j)n is the marginal value of en + xn, the input inventory after procurement in period n,
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Proof: Clearly, UN = SNeN is concave and piecewise linear in eN for all eN ≥ 0. Further,





[∆N−1− p]mN−1−hI [eN−1 +xN−1−mN−1]
+βEIN−1 [SN ]× (eN−1 +xN−1−mN−1)
}
UN−1 is the solution of a linear program and eN−1 appears in the right hand side of the constraints.
Thus, UN−1 is piecewise linear and concave in eN−1. Further, the change in slope of UN−1 occurs
at integral multiples of D, since the processing and procurement capacities are integral multiples
of D.
Suppose Ut is piecewise linear and concave, with change in slope at integral multiples of D for
all t = n+1, n +2, . . . ,N . That is, for each t≥ n+1, we have
Ut(et,It) = Θkt et +λkt for et ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD)
where λkt is a constant independent of et, Ut is continuous in et and Θkt ≥ Θk+1t for all integers
k≥ 1.





[∆n− p]mn−Snxn−hI [en +xn−mn] +βEIn [Un+1(en+1,In+1)]
}
By the induction assumption on Un+1, Un(en,In) is the solution of a linear program with en in the
right hand side of the constraint. Thus, Un(en,In) is concave and piecewise linear in en.



















[∆n− p]mn−hI [yn−mn] +βEIn [Un+1(yn−mn,In+1)]
}
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By the induction assumption, Un+1(en+1,In+1) is concave and piecewise linear in en+1. Thus,
Ln is the solution of a linear programming problem and hence piecewise linear and concave in yn,
where yn is the input inventory after procurement, but before processing. For yn and mn such that






















where λjn+1 is a constant independent of yn and mn.
For a given yn, as mn increases, j such that yn−mn ∈ [(j−1)D,jD) decreases. Therefore, as mn
increases, the coefficient of mn, given by [∆n−p− [βEIn [Θjn+1]−hI ]], decreases since Θjn+1 ≥Θ(j+1)n+1 .
Thus, the optimal value of mn is the maximum possible value for which the coefficient remains
non-negative or zero, which ever is higher. For yn ∈ [(s−1)D,sD) where s is a positive integer and





C if βEIn [Θs−an+1]−hI ≤∆n− p
yn− r̂D if βEIn [Θsn+1]−hI ≤∆n− p < βEIn [Θs−an+1]−hI
0 if ∆n− p < βEIn [Θsn+1]−hI
(15)
where r̂D = argmax
r
{
βEIn [Θrn+1]−hI > ∆n− p
}
. Upon substituting m∗n corresponding to each of





(βEIn [Θs−an+1]−hI)yn +(∆n− p−β[EIn [Θs−an+1]−hI ])C +βEIn [λs−an+1]
(∆n− p)yn− (∆n− p− [β[EIn [Θr̂n+1]−hI ])r̂D +EIn [λr̂n+1]




βEIn [Θsn+1]−hI ,min{∆n− p,βEIn [Θs−an+1]−hI}
}
yn +Υsn (16)
where Υsn denotes constant terms not dependent on yn.
Notice that the slope of Ln(·, ·) with respect to yn when yn ∈ [(s−1)D,sD) is equal to Ω(s)n , where
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Ω(s)n is given by equation (13). Thus, Ω(s)n denotes the marginal value of a unit of input inventory




For yn ∈ [(s−1)D,sD), substituting Ln(yn,In) from equation (16), the objective function in the





By the induction assumption, we have Θjn+1 ≥Θ(j+1)n+1 for all j and as a result Ω(s)n is non-increasing
in s. Thus, the slope of yn decreases as yn increases. For en ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD) where k is a positive






en +K if Ω(k+b)n ≥ Sn
ŝD if Ω(k)n ≥ Sn > Ω(k+b)n
en if Sn > Ω(k)n
(17)













where Ψkn is a constant independent of en.
Thus, Un(en,In) is piecewise linear in en with breaks at integral multiples of D. Further, because
Ω(k+1)n ≤Ω(k)n , we have Θk+1n ≤Θkn for all non-negative integers k. ¤
The optimal processing quantity m∗n given by equation (15) is based on comparing the value of
∆n − p relative to the marginal value-to-go, βEIn [Θsn+1]− hI , of the input inventory evaluated at
yn, the input inventory level after procurement. It is useful to state the optimal policy in terms
of parameters that can be evaluated based on the state variables at the beginning of the period,
instead. Substituting the optimal procure up to level for the input given by equation (17), we
can re-state the optimal procurement and processing quantities for a given realization of In and a
starting input inventory level en as follows.
Proposition 1. For all n < N , let Ω(k)n be as defined in equation (13). For a starting input inven-
tory level en such that en ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD) where k is a positive integer,
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K if Ω(k+b)n > Sn
ŝD− en if Ω(k)n ≥ Sn ≥Ω(k+b)n
0 if Ω(k)n < Sn
(18)
where ŝ = argmax
s∈Z
{Ω(s)n > Sn}.





C if Ω(k)n < ∆n− p
min{(en +x∗n− r̂D)+,C} if Ω(k)n ≥∆n− p≥Ω(k+b)n
0 if Ω(k+b)n > ∆n− p
(19)
where r̂ = argmax
r∈Z
{Ω(r)n > ∆n− p}.
The above result implies that in each period there exist two inventory and state dependent
thresholds Ω(k)n and Ω(k+b)n with Ω(k)n ≥ Ω(k+b)n such that it is optimal to procure up to capac-
ity (respectively, procure nothing) if the marginal cost of procurement Sn is less than the lower
threshold (respectively, greater than the higher threshold). Similarly, it is optimal to process up
to capacity (respectively, process nothing) if the benefit from processing ∆n − p is greater than
the higher threshold (respectively, less than the lower threshold). For values of Sn and ∆n − p in
between the two thresholds, the procurement and processing quantities are interdependent.
To illustrate the results in Proposition 1, consider the example where C = K; i.e., a = b = 1 and
D = C = K. Figure 2 shows the value of Ω(k)n as a function of en (i.e., for different k), for a given
realization of In where Sn < ∆n− p. By the definition of ŝ and r̂ given in Proposition 1, we have
ŝ = 7 and r̂ = 3.
Region A, k = {1,2}, en < 2D: At these levels of starting input inventory, the expected marginal
value of unprocessed input inventory even after procurement up to capacity is greater than ∆n−p.
Thus, it would not be optimal for the firm to process any input in this region. Further, the expected
value of input inventory is greater than Sn, thus making procurement up to capacity optimal.
Notice that in this region we have Ω(k+b)n = Ω(k+1)n > ∆n− p. This situation corresponds to the first
and last cases respectively in the procurement and processing policy given by equations (18) and
(19).
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Figure 2 Illustration of optimal policy when Sn ≤∆n− p, for C = K
Region B, k = {3}, en ∈ [2D,3D): In this region, procuring up to capacity will result in en+xn =
en + D ≥ r̂D. Thus, the value from processing ∆n − p can be greater than the expected marginal
value from keeping the input unprocessed at that inventory level. Thus, the optimal quantity to
process is such that en + xn −mn = r̂D. Because ∆n − p > Sn, there is an instantaneous margin
from procurement and processing, and it is optimal for the firm to procure up to capacity and
process en +D− r̂D. Thus, in region B, even though en < r̂D, we find that it is optimal to process
a positive quantity, after procuring up to capacity. As in region A, we have Ω(k+b)n = Ω(k+1)n > Sn
in this region also, corresponding to the first case in the optimal procurement policy given by
equation (18). We also have Ω(k+b)n = Ω(4)n = ∆n− p < Ω(3)n = Ω(k)n , corresponding to the second case
in the optimal processing policy given by equation (19).
Region C, k = {4,5,6}, en ∈ [3D,6D): The value from processing, ∆n− p, is greater than the
value from keeping the input unprocessed. Thus, it is optimal for the firm to process as long as the
final input inventory level is at least r̂D, below which the expected marginal value from unprocessed
input is greater than ∆n − p. Also, since ∆n − p > Sn, it is always optimal to procure additional
input to ensure the processing capacity is utilized fully. Thus, in this region it is optimal to process
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up to capacity. Further, the expected marginal value of input inventory after procurement up to
capacity and processing is greater than Sn. Thus, it is also optimal to procure up to capacity in
this region. Notice that in this region we have ∆n − p≥ Ω(k)n > Ω(k+1)n > Sn, corresponding to the
first case in equations (18) and (19) respectively.
Region D, k = {7}, en ∈ [6D,7D): It is optimal to process up to capacity because ∆n − p
is greater than the expected marginal value of unprocessed input at en − D ∈ [5D,6D). Thus,
the optimal processing quantity is limited only by the processing capacity in this region and any
additional inventory procured in the current period will remain unprocessed. Further, it is optimal
to procure additional input as long as the expected marginal value of the unprocessed input is
greater than Sn; i.e., xn is such that en +xn−C = 6D or xn = 7D− en = ŝD− en ≤K. Notice that
in this region we have ∆n− p > Ω(k)n = Ω(7)n > Sn > Ω(8)n = Ω(k+1)n , corresponding to the second and
first cases respectively in equations (18) and (19).
Region E, k≥ 8, en ≥ 7D: Similar to the earlier case, we can see that processing up to capacity
is optimal. Thus any additional input procured at these inventory levels will remain unprocessed.
We have en−mn = en−D≥ 6D. Since the expected marginal value of unprocessed input inventory
at these levels is less than Sn, it is optimal not to procure any additional input. In this region, we
have ∆n − p > Sn > Ω(k)n , corresponding to the last and first cases respectively in equations (18)
and (19).
When Sn > ∆n− p, as shown in Figure 3, we can similarly divide the state space corresponding
to the beginning input inventory into: 1) regions A and B, where it is optimal to only procure
(and procure up to capacity in region A), 2) region C, where it is optimal to do nothing and 3)
regions D and E, where it is optimal to only process (and process up to capacity in region E).
In both the figures, we can see that the regions of positive procurement and processing quantities
correspond to regions where Sn ≤ Ω(k)n and ∆n − p ≥ Ω(k+b)n . Further, notice that ŝD and r̂D
represent target ‘procure up to’ and ‘process down to’ inventory levels. This is similar to the
target base stock levels in the single commodity, capacitated warehouse management problem (cf.
Secomandi (2009b)). However, unlike the single commodity case, we can have instances where ŝD >
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Figure 3 Illustration of optimal policy when Sn > ∆n− p, for C = K
r̂D; i.e., there can be inventory levels at which both procurement and processing are optimal. This
happens whenever there is an immediate margin from procurement and processing; i.e., ∆n− p >
Sn, which is never possible in the single commodity procurement and trade problem.
In the next section, we extend the analysis to consider the more general situation of convex
procurement costs encountered in the e-Choupal and other commodity processing contexts.
2.2. Convex Cost of Procurement
The analysis thus far assumed that the procurement cost is linear in the quantity procured and
the firm pays the spot price per unit. This is generally true when the firm is small and the firm’s
actions do not affect the market prices. However, even for such firms the cost of procurement may
not necessarily be linear. Consider ITC’s e-Choupal network where at each hub procurement is
through the direct channel as well as the spot market. Under such circumstances, the total cost of
procurement over both sources would ideally be a piecewise linear convex function because of the
‘merit order’ of procurement (cf., Bannister and Kaye (1991)); i.e., the firm will procure from the
cheaper source first before using the more costly channel.2 Other instances where a convex cost of
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procurement may arise is when the firm procures over multiple locations to serve a single processing
and trade location. As we discuss later in Section 3, the results developed for the single node convex
procurement cost case will be useful when analyzing the integrated problem over a network. With
this motivation, we consider the situation when the firm has a convex cost of procurement.
We assume all aspects of the operations remain the same as in Section 2, except for the procure-
ment cost. Let the total cost of procuring xn units of input when the spot price is Sn be denoted
by C (Sn, xn). We model C (Sn, xn) as a piecewise linear, convex function such that
C (Sn, xn) =
{
γjSn× [xn−Kj−1] +αj if Kj−1 < xn ≤Kj
γ1Sn×xn if 0≤ xn ≤K1 (20)
where γj > γj−1 and Kj > Kj−1 for all j = 1,2, . . . , J and αj are such that C (Sn, xn) is continuous
in xn. Let γ0 = 0 and K0 = 0. Notice that the linear cost of procurement is a special case of this
function with J = 1 and the values bJ = b and γJ = 1. Further, a general convex cost of procurement
can be approximated by a piecewise linear function such as this by varying the number of segments
in the cost function.
Notice that the optimal commitment policy for selling the output and the marginal value of a
unit of output inventory is not affected by the procurement cost. Thus, Lemma 1 holds for this case
and the marginal value of output is given by equation (7). Further, the value function Vn(en,Qn,In)
is separable in en and Qn as shown.





[∆n− p]mn−C (Sn, xn)
−hI [en +xn−mn] +βEIn [Un+1(en+1,In+1)]
}
We now focus on computing the marginal value of input inventory when the procurement cost
is given by equation (20). To this end, let D be the greatest common divisor (GCD) of (C,K1−
K0,K2−K1, . . . ,KJ−KJ−1). Let (a, b1, b2, . . . , bJ) be positive integers such that C = aD and Kj =
bjD for all j = 1,2, . . . , J and b0 = 0. Using arguments similar to those in the proof of Theorem 1,
we can prove the next result.
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Theorem 2. The value function Un(en,In) is continuous, concave and piecewise linear in en with
changes in slope at integral multiples of D, for each realization of In when the procurement cost is
given by C (Sn, xn), as defined in equation (20). Let Θkn denote the marginal value of input inventory
(i.e., slope of Un) when en ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD) where k is an integer.
For all n, let Θkn ,∞ for k≤ 0. In the last period, ΘkN = SN for all k≥ 1. For any period n < N
and k≥ 1, the marginal value of input inventory Θkn , Θ(k,J)n where
Θ(k,j)n =
{











for j = 1,2, . . . , J (21)
and Ω(k)n is given by equation (13).
Similar to the linear procurement cost case, we can define thresholds based on Ω(k)n to characterize
the optimal procurement and processing policy when the procurement cost is convex and piecewise
linear. However, the procurement policy is more involved and characterized by J + 1 thresholds.
More specifically,
Proposition 2. For all n < N , let Ω(k)n be as defined in equation (13). Then, in period n





Kj−1 if γj−1Sn ≤Ω(k+bj−1)n < γjSn
ŝjD− en if Ω(k+bj−1)n ≥ γjSn ≥Ω(k+b
j)
n
















C if Ω(k)n < ∆n− p





n > ∆n− p
where r̂ = argmax
r∈Z
{Ω(r)n > ∆n− p}.
The results in Theorem 2 have been derived assuming the γj are stationary. However, equation
(21) can easily incorporate non-stationary values of γj, thus allowing us to model time varying
procurement cost functions. More significantly, the γj values can also be stochastic, with the
realized values of γj being used in equation (21). In such a case, the variable In would include
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(γ1n, γ2n, . . .) as part of the state variable. Similarly, equation (21) can be modified to easily incor-
porate non-stationary and stochastic values of bj; i.e., the procurement capacities in each segment
of the piecewise linear cost function need not be the same across periods. Stochastic γj and bj are
useful to model multiple sources of procurement, with stochastic marginal cost of procurement at
each source. In Section 3, we present a specific instance where these generalizations are useful in
developing heuristics for the integrated problem over a star network.
We now discuss computational issues associated with calculating the optimal policy.
2.3. Computation of Optimal Policy
The analytical results derived in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 did not depend on the specific dynamics of the
various commodity prices. However, computing the conditional expectations in the marginal value
of output and input inventory expressions (equations (6)–(7), (12) and (21)) depends on the specific
model used to describe the evolution of In. For the purposes of developing the computational
procedures, we assume the dynamics of the various commodity prices follow a Markov process; i.e.,
In = (Sn,F 1n ,F 2n , . . . ,F `n, . . . , F Ln ). For instance, single factor mean-reverting processes and multi-
dimensional, driftless geometric Brownian motion processes which are typically used to model
commodity spot price and forward curve dynamics would fall under this category.
A standard approach developed in the financial literature for pricing derivatives, especially Amer-
ican style options which require evaluation of conditional expectations, involves discretizing the
price processes using binomial or trinomial lattices to generate possible states of price realizations
with corresponding probabilities of transition in discrete time steps. The objective is to approx-
imate the joint evolution of the continuous time processes over the time period of interest. The
option can then be valued on the generated price lattice by using backward stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming recursion, using the terminal value of the option on the final set of approximated prices
(cf., Ho et al. (1995), Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990), Hahn and Dyer (2008) for some examples
of discrete-time lattices).
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We can use a similar approach to generate a discrete-time lattice for the various prices and
calculate the marginal values (and hence the optimal policy) at each node in the tree. Notice
that we do not need to discretize the state variable corresponding to the input inventory because
of the piecewise linear nature of the value function. These discretization procedures are fairly
efficient when modeling bivariate processes. We can readily use these different price discretization
procedures when there is a single output forward contract or all output forward price changes are
perfectly correlated. In these cases, we can compute the optimal marginal values at all nodes in
the price lattice and thus compute the optimal policy efficiently.
While the discretization procedures are theoretically valid for modeling multivariate processes,
they become computationally inefficient as the number of processes increases. Thus, in the more
general case with multiple forward contracts and imperfectly correlated price changes, we need to
resort to tractable approximations to compute the marginal values efficiently. We describe one such
computationally tractable approximation next.
2.3.1. Heuristic for computing marginal values. As mentioned, the primary difficulty in
using the binomial trees is the fact that modeling more than two processes jointly becomes com-
putationally inefficient. To overcome this, we consider an approximation where only the dynamics
of the input spot price and the nearest maturing forward contract are modeled in any period n.
More precisely, define
În = (Sn,F `n,F `+11 ,F `+21 , . . . ,F L1 ) for n such that N`−1 ≤ n < N` (22)
The variable În approximates the information available in period n by only considering Sn and
F `n, while assuming no information other than the initial prices of the remaining contracts is known.
Thus, in the interval, N`−1 ≤ n < N`, we only consider the joint evolution of (Sn,F `n) and take all
expectations conditional on În. This approach is similar to the information approximation used in
the approximate dynamic programming model of Lai et al. (2009a).
Next, we approximate the marginal value of output inventory given in equations (6) and (7) by
conditioning the expectations on În instead of In as follows.
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if N`−1 ≤ n < N` for ` = 1,2, . . . ,L
0 if n≥NL
(24)
We approximate marginal value of input inventory in a similar manner. That is,











for n < N and all positive integers k and Θ̂kN = SN for all positive integers k. For all n < N , we set
Θ̂kn ,∞ for k≤ 0.
The heuristic procurement, processing and commitment quantities (x̂n, m̂n, q̂n) are then given
by the results in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 with the approximate marginal values replacing the
true marginal values. We can also define the approximate marginal value of input inventory when
the procurement cost is convex and piecewise linear in an analogous manner, using equation (21).
Notice that this heuristic requires only modeling the joint evolution of two price processes in any
given period. Further, the heuristic is exact in the case where a single forward contract is available
for selling the output commodity. Thus, the binomial discretization approaches mentioned earlier
can be used to compute the approximate marginal values efficiently. We discuss the mechanics of
implementing this heuristic in Section 2.4.1. We now develop a computationally tractable upper
bound on the optimal expected profits, which will be used as a benchmark to evaluate the per-
formance of the heuristic. We quantify the performance of the heuristic using numerical studies in
Section 2.4.
2.3.2. Upper Bound on optimal expected profits. We construct an upper bound for the
optimal expected profits using the approach of information relaxation and dual penalties described
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in Brown et al. (2008). The key idea is that when information constraints are relaxed, i.e., more
information is available at the time of decision than in the original problem, the solution to the
relaxed problem will be an upper bound on the solution to the original problem. An optimal
policy with the information relaxation can potentially take advantage of the additional information
available to improve the solution, leading to temporally infeasible policies for the original problem.
This is similar to relaxing the constraints in a linear program. Analogous to the dual variables
corresponding to the constraints in a linear program which penalize violations of the constraints
in the original problem, Brown et al. (2008) define dual penalties for information relaxations. Akin
to the strong duality result for linear programs, the solution to the relaxed problem is equal to
the optimal solution of the original problem when an ideal dual penalty is used. Furthermore, for
any appropriately defined feasible dual penalties, the solution to the relaxed problem provides an
upper bound to the optimal solution of the original problem. We use this technique to compute an
upper bound on the optimal expected profits of the original problem.
We consider the perfect information relaxation for developing the upper bound to the single
node problem; that is, we consider a information structure where the input spot prices and output
forward prices for all periods are known at the beginning of the horizon. Let ΓN = (In)Nn=1 be a
particular sample path of prices over the entire horizon. In period n, let zn(en, qn, xn,mn,ΓN) be a
feasible dual penalty. For a specific ΓN , let HUBn (en,Qn; ΓN) be defined as
HUBN (eN ,QN ; ΓN) = SNeN (27)









− zn(en, qn, xn,mn,ΓN)+βHUBn+1(en+1,Qn+1; ΓN)
}
for n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1 (28)
where en+1 and Qn+1 are given by the state transition equations (4)–(5) and Bn is the constraint








qn = 0 if n 6= N`− 1 for `∈ {1,2, . . . ,L}
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Notice that HUBn is the same as Vn given by equations (2)–(3), except for the penalty term zn
and the fact that decisions involved in evaluating HUBn are made under perfect information. Define
V UB1 (e1,Q1,I1) as
V UB1 (e1,Q1,I1) = EI1 [HUB1 (e1,Q1; ΓN)] (29)
where the expectation is taken over all ΓN .
Using different dual feasible penalties gives different values of V UB1 . For instance, by setting the
dual penalty zn = 0 identically for all n, we get the perfect information upper bound equal to the
optimal profit when the decision maker has perfect foresight. Consider an ideal dual penalty in
period n defined as






Substituting this ideal penalty in the optimization in equation (28) will lead to V UB1 = V1, a
tight bound. However, using the ideal penalty described above is not practical as it would require
computing the exact value function. Using a feasible dual penalty that is easy to compute and
approximates the ideal penalty closely can be expected to provide a close upper bound on the
optimal expected profits. Consequently, we consider dual penalties derived from the approximate
value-to-go function
V̂n+1(en+1,Qn+1, În+1) = ∆̂n+1Qn+1 +Θ̂kn+1en+1 + λ̂kn for en+1 ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD)
where the marginal values, ∆̂n+1 and Θ̂kn+1, are given by equations (24) and (25) and λ̂kn+1 are
constants such that V̂n+1 is continuous in en+1 and λ̂1n = 0 for all n.
We then have
Proposition 3. V UB1 (e1,Q1,I1) as defined in equation (29), with dual penalties given by







is an upper bound on the optimal value function V1(e1,Q1,I1).
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Proof: The dual penalty in equation (30) is a feasible penalty and hence, by Proposition 3.1
in Brown et al. (2008), V UB1 (e1,Q1,I1)≥ V1(e1,Q1,I1). ¤
Notice that the DP given by (28) is a deterministic DP for each ΓN . Thus the upper bound V UB1
can be computed using Monte Carlo simulation by solving a deterministic optimization problem for
each sample path, and averaging over sample paths. The computation of the upper bound problem
along each sample path is described in Appendix A.
2.4. Numerical Study
In this section, we describe several numerical studies to support our analysis. We discretize the
various price processes and compute the optimal and approximate marginal values, as the case
may be, on the resulting discrete time price lattice.
We first demonstrate the computational efficiency of the procedure by computing the optimal
policy when a single forward is available for output sales. We compare the expected profits gen-
erated by using the optimal policy for different levels of discretization and evaluate the tradeoff
between the improvement in expected profits versus additional computational time as the number
of discretization steps increases. These results are presented in Section 2.4.2.
We also perform numerical studies for the general case with multiple forward contracts. For
the general case, we use the heuristic described in described in Section 2.3.1. We measure the
performance of the heuristic by comparing the expected profits using the heuristic with the upper
bound on optimal expected profits. We study how the gap between the expected profit and the
upper bound changes with various parameters. The performance of the heuristic is quantified in
Section 2.4.3. We now describe the implementation of the heuristic.
2.4.1. Implementation The input spot and output forward prices are continuous and evolve
continuously in time. In the commodity pricing literature, one factor mean-reverting processes have
often been used to model the spot price process for various commodities, including agricultural
commodities (cf. Geman (2005), Chapter 3). While multi-factor models have also been used (see
for instance Gibson and Schwartz (1990), Schwartz and Smith (2000), Geman and Nguyen (2005)),
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the single factor mean-reverting dynamics capture many of the essential features of commodity
spot prices and are also analytically tractable. We use a single factor mean reverting model as
in Schwartz (1997) to describe the evolution of the input spot price over the time interval [0, T ].
More specifically, the dynamics of the input spot price St are modeled as lnS(t) = χ(t) + µ(t)
where χ(t) represents the short-term deviation in prices and µ(t) the equilibrium price level. The
short-term deviation χ(t) follows a mean-reverting process given by dχ(t) =−κχ(t)dt+ σsdWs(t),
where dWs(t) is the increment of a standard Brownian motion, κ is the mean-reversion coefficient
and σs the volatility.
Multi-dimensional driftless geometric Brownian motion processes have been used commonly to
model the dynamics of commodity forward curves (cf., Geman (2005), Lai et al. (2009a)). We
model the risk-neutral dynamics of the output forward price with maturity at time T` by a driftless
geometric Brownian motion, with constant volatility σ` > 0 as
dF (t,T`)
F (t,T`)
= σ`dW`(t) where dW`(t) is
the increment of a standard Brownian motion. The Brownian motion increments corresponding to
forward prices with maturities T` and Tk have a constant correlation coefficient ρ`k ∈ [−1,1]. Also,
the Brownian motion increment corresponding to forward price with maturity T` has a constant
correlation coefficient ρ`s ∈ [−1,1] with the Brownian motion increment corresponding to the input
spot price. The parameters for the input spot and output forward price processes used in the
numerical studies are given in Appendix B.
For computing the heuristic policy, we use a discretization of the dynamics of the input and
output spot prices, with n = 1 corresponding to time t = 0 and n = N` to t = T`, for each `. For
each ` ∈ {1,2, . . . ,L}, we construct a 3-dimensional binomial tree as described in Hahn and Dyer
(2008) with δ discretization steps between each period n and n+1 to represent the joint evolution
of (S(t),F (t, T`)), conditional on F k0 for k > `. From each of these trees, we obtain a probability
mass function G`n(Sn+1,F `n+1|Sn,F `n) for each n≤N`− 1, for each node in the tree at time n. The
probability mass function G`n(·) is used to compute expectations, conditional on În.
We also generate a 3-dimensional binomial tree to represent the evolution of (F (t, T`),F (t, T`+1))
for each ` ∈ {1,2, . . . ,L − 1}. From each tree, we obtain a probability mass function
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Ĥ`N`−1(F
`+1
N`−1|F `N`−1) which denotes the probability that the next immediately maturing forward
price is equal to F `+1, conditional on the immediately maturing forward price being equal to F `.
The probability mass function Ĥ`n(·), along with G`(·) is used to compute expectations, conditional
















to approximate the transition probabilities at the expiration of forward contract ` for ` < L.
We compute the heuristic marginal values ∆̂n and Θ̂kn for each period n at each node in the
binomial tree by using the input spot price value Sn at the node, forward price F `n for n such
that N`−1 ≤ n < N`, and the probability mass functions G`n for N`−1 ≤ n < N` − 1 and Ĝ`N`−1 for
n = N`− 1.
We evaluate the policy using Monte Carlo simulation. We generate sample paths of prices for
periods n = 1,2, . . . ,N by sampling from the true continuous time and space price processes. At
period n such that N`−1 ≤ n < N`, we round the realized prices of Sn and F `n to the closest
discretized values in the 3-dimensional binomial tree. The heuristic policy parameters (x̂n, m̂n, q̂n)
are computed using the values of ∆̂n+1 and Θ̂kn+1 stored at each node and the probability mass
functions. Expected profits from using the heuristic policy are calculated as the average profit over
1000 sample paths.
For each sample path, we determine the dual penalty for each period n by using the approximate
marginal values at the node in the 3-dimensional binomial tree which is closest to the realized
prices Sn and F `n. The optimization problem given by equation (28) is then solved for each sample
path as a mixed-integer linear program. Given the nature of the problem, it is not guaranteed that
an optimal solution to the upper bound problem can be found in reasonable time for each sample
path. To ensure the upper bound computations terminate, we impose a limit on the computation
times for the upper bound calculation along each sample path. For sample paths in which an
optimal solution to the mixed-integer linear program is not found within this time limit, we use
the optimal value of the linear programming relaxation of the mixed-integer problem as the upper
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bound value. The average over all sample paths is computed to obtain the upper bound on the
optimal expected profits. Notice that the upper bound value thus computed overstates the true
upper bound value obtained from information relaxation. The gap between the upper bound, UB,
and the expected profits from the heuristic policy is computed and expressed as a percentage of
UB.
For all the numerical studies presented here, the marginal processing cost was set to p = 5.
Observe that a processing cost of p = 5 corresponds to an expected processing margin of 0 that
allows us to model situations when the actual realized processing margin may be positive or neg-
ative. Also, we assume no discounting, i.e., β = 1, and the holding costs to be negligible. The
procurement capacity was set to K = 5 and the processing capacity to C = 3. Thus, the processing
capacity is 60% of the procurement capacity, reflective of the ITC case. Finally, the procurement
cost is linear for all the numerical studies presented here.
2.4.2. Computing the Optimal Policy – Single Forward. Recall that the heuristic pro-
posed in Section 2.3.1 is optimal for the case when only a single forward contract is available for
output sales. We investigate the impact of discretization on the optimal expected profits by cal-
culating the expected profits for δ ∈ {5,10,15}. Table 1 gives the simulation results when a single
forward contract is available for output sales and the number of periods in the horizon is varied
from N = 5 to N = 20, for different values of δ. The values in parentheses are the average CPU
time in seconds required to compute the optimal policy and the corresponding increase in the
CPU time required as δ increases. We do not have results for δ = 15 and N = 20 as the maximum
memory available to the program was not enough to solve the problem (we used MATLAB R©). The
standard errors for the expected profits above range from 1.2% to 2.4% of the expected profits.
As expected, the optimal expected profits increase with the number of discretization steps for
each horizon length (The value of −0.19% in the table is statistically insignificant). However, the
percentage increase is only marginal, especially when compared to the increase in computational
burden as evidenced by the CPU times required to compute the policy. Using a small number of
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Table 1 Optimal expected profits and CPU Time (Single forward)
N
Optimal Value % increase in Value
(Avg. CPU Time in sec.) (% increase in CPU Time)
δ = 5 δ = 10 δ = 15 δ : 5→ 10 δ : 10→ 15
5 9.92 10.28 10.26 3.06% -0.19%(0.55) (2.12) (7.18) (287.33%) (237.70%)
10 47.95 48.78 49.17 1.72% 0.80%(18.04) (52.77) (175.77) (192.60%) (233.07%)
15 114.43 114.56 114.72 0.11% 0.14%(36.32) (294.26) (1024.77) (710.11%) (248.25%)
20 151.54 152.89 - 0.89% -
(140.56) (980.68) - (597.67%) -
Table 2 Expected profits using heuristic policy (Multiple forwards)
# of Forwards L Horizon Length N Heuristic UB Gap Avg. CPU
(Maturity Dates {N`}) Value Value (Std. Error) Time (sec.)
2 10 45.46 49.78 8.68% 57.54
{5,10} (4.22%)
3 15 94.73 104.54 9.38% 388.16
{5,10,15} (3.30%)
4 20 141.59 165.55 14.48% 1608.33
{5,10,15,20} (3.01%)
discretization steps, especially for longer horizon problems, is therefore computationally efficient
with practically no loss in optimality. We fix the number of discretization steps δ to 10 for all the
remaining studies.
2.4.3. Performance of Heuristic Policy – Multiple Forwards. In this section, we quan-
tify the performance of the heuristic when multiple forward contracts are available for the output.
When more than one forward contract is available for selling the output, the heuristic is no longer
optimal. We investigate the performance of the heuristic as the number of forward contracts avail-
able for the output commodity varies from L = 2 to L = 4. The results of the simulation are given in
Table 2, with the gap and standard error being expressed as a % of the upper bound value. As seen
from the results, the heuristics perform quite well, even when there are multiple forward contracts.
Also, recall that the upper bound value reported here is overstated and the true gap between the
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upper bound and expected profits is potentially less than the gaps reported here. Finally, the time
taken to compute the heuristics are not significantly different from the single forward case, as seen
by the CPU times.
A key parameter affecting the accuracy of the heuristic is the correlation between the Brownian
motion increments of the different forward price processes. For instance, if the Brownian motion
increments were all perfectly correlated, the heuristic would actually be optimal. While we do not
report the results here, we performed numerical experiments varying the correlation coefficient
between the various price processes and found that the results did not vary significantly.
3. The Star Network Problem
In reality, in the e-Choupal and other commodity business contexts, especially agricultural com-
modities, procurement is usually done over multiple locations. We now extend our analysis to
consider the integrated problem of procurement, processing and trade over a star network with
multiple locations. In addition to providing analytical tractability, a star network configuration
also approximates real world commodity processing networks fairly well. In a star network, a pro-
curement source for the input commodity usually serves at most one processing location, while a
processing plant may have the input transshipped from multiple locations. This is definitely the
case with the e-Choupal network, where a set of procurement hubs are associated with a processing
plant. Due to the geographic proximity and availability of information, differences in prices across
the various procurement hubs are usually not significant enough to justify transshipment of the
input between the non-processing locations. While the network problem is more complex than the
single node problem, some of the insights from the single node problem extend to the network case.
The results for the single node problem with convex cost of procurement are especially useful and
instrumental in developing a tractable heuristic to solve the network problem.
We consider a multi-node network of M procurement nodes each with procurement capacity of
Ki units per period at location i ∈ i = 1,2, . . . ,M . Let Sin denote the price for the input in the
spot market at location i. We consider a star network configuration, with location 1 being the
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central node with a processing capacity of C units, while all other nodes only have a procurement
capacity. The transshipment cost is t(j) per unit between locations 1 and j for j = 2,3, . . . ,M .
Since the only source of (direct) revenue at the non-processing locations is through trade of the
input commodity, the firm has an incentive to transship input from one non-processing location to
another only when there is an arbitrage opportunity on the input commodity between the locations;
i.e., if the difference in expected trade prices is more than the transshipment cost between the
locations. These arbitrage opportunities are not relevant to the core operations considered in our
model and therefore to eliminate such opportunities, we do not allow direct transshipment between
the non-processing locations3; i.e., t(ij) =∞ for (i, j)∈ {2,3, . . . ,M}×{2,3, . . . ,M}.
Let en = (e1, e2, . . . , eM) be the vector of input inventories at the M locations. Since there is only
a single processing location, the output inventory is still a scalar value Qn. The firm’s decisions
include a) the quantity of input to procure at each location: xn = (x1n, x2n, . . . , xMn ), b) the quantity of
the input commodity to be transshipped between the processing and other procurement locations:
yn = (y(ij)n : i 6= j, i = 1 or j = 1) where y(ij)n is the quantity transshipped from location i to location
j, c) the quantity of the output commodity to be committed for sale: qn, and d) the quantity of
input to be processed into output in period n: mn.
Notice that the network structure does not affect the optimal commitment policy for selling the
output and the marginal value of a unit of output inventory. Thus, Lemma 1 holds for this case and
the marginal value of output is given by equation (7). Further, the value function Vn(en,Qn,In) is
































where the set of feasible actions in period n, Bn is given by
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y(i1) ≤ ein +xin for i = 2,3, . . . ,M


















y(1j)n −mn for i = 1
ein +xin + y(1i)n − y(i1)n for i = 2, . . . ,M
(34)
Notice that (32) is linear in eN and thereby, also piecewise linear. Similar to the single node
problem, we can use induction arguments to show that Un(en,In) is piecewise linear and concave
in en. While it is theoretically possible, it is hard to derive expressions for the marginal value of
inventory at location i as it depends not just on ein, but the entire inventory vector en. As such, it
is hard to obtain further insights into the network problem without additional simplifications. In
the next section, we consider one such simplified network and use the insights to develop a heuristic
for the network problem.
3.1. Heuristic for the Star Network
The heuristic described in Section 2.3.1 overcame the high dimensionality introduced by the output
price processes by only considering the joint evolution of the input spot and nearest maturing out-
put forward price. In case of the network problem, we have to consider multiple input spot prices,
since the input price changes across locations are usually imperfectly correlated. We could poten-
tially use the same information approximation techniques developed for the single node problem
to account for these additional price processes. However, solving the network problem optimally
is further complicated by the fact that the marginal value of input inventory is generally different
across the various locations and dependent on the inventory levels at the different locations and
not just the aggregate input inventory.
Under some simplifying assumptions, the network problem is tractable and is equivalent to the
single node problem with piecewise linear, convex cost of procurement. To see this, consider a
situation where all the procurement nodes are close to the central processing location such that the
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transshipment costs between the nodes are a very small fraction of the commodity prices. However,
the input commodity prices realized in the spot markets can still be different across locations.
Further, consider the case when the trade price at the end of the horizon for the input is the same,
irrespective of which node the input is physically stored at. Thus we have, t(i) ' 0 and SiN ' SN
























with the same state transition equations as before.
Notice that the input inventory across different locations are indistinguishable in their marginal




n and drop the transshipment decisions



















for n < N
UN(êN ,IN) = SN êN





0≤ xin ≤Ki for i = 1,2, . . . ,M
0≤mn ≤C








Notice that even though the input inventory across various locations are indistinguishable, the
marginal cost of procurement, Sin, is still different across locations and is retained in the above
optimization. The SDP equations above are the same as those for the single node, convex procure-
ment cost case, albeit with stochastic γj because the Sin are stochastic. We can therefore use the
results from Section 2.2 to solve this simplified network problem. The heuristic for the general star
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network is based on the equivalence between the simplified network and the single node problem
and has two stages. The first stage approximates the star network as a single node with a piecewise
linear convex cost of procurement. In the second stage, we use the approximations developed for
the single node problem to model the joint evolution of the various price processes.
Let S(j)n be the jth order statistic of Sn = (S1n, S2n, . . . , SMn ). Let ij be the index of the location


















for j = 1,2, . . . ,M , for all n.
Let D be the greatest common divisor of (C, K̄1, K̄2 − K̄1, . . . , K̄M − K̄M−1) where K̄j is the
average K̄jn over all n. Define (a, b1, . . . , bM) to be positive integers such that C = aD and K̄j = bjD.
We approximate the star network by an equivalent single node with a procurement cost function
given by equation (20), where Sn = S1n and the γjn and Kj are given as above. For this single node
network, we can calculate the approximate marginal value of input inventory Θ̂kn, according to
equation (21) and using the approximation scheme described in Section 2.3.1.
To compute the heuristic procurement, transshipment and processing quantities for the general
network problem, we define the approximate value function as





n if (k− 1)D≤
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We can use dual penalties based on these heuristics and compute an upper bound on the optimal
expected profits for the network case using the procedure described in Section 2.3.2. This upper
bound can then be used to evaluate the performance of the heuristics for the network case.
3.2. Numerical Study
We investigate the performance of the heuristic for a two-node and a five-node network respectively.
As in the single node case, the output forward prices are modeled as driftless geometric Brownian
motions. The input spot price at each location, Si(t), have the same dynamics as in the single node
case. The correlations between the various prices are given in Appendix B.
For the two-node network, the processing capacity was set to C = 3 and the procurement capac-
ities at the two locations was set to K1 = 3 and K2 = 2 respectively. For the five-node network,
the processing capacity was set to C = 6 and the procurement capacity was set to Ki = 2 for all i.
The transshipment cost in both networks was set to 0.5 per unit.
The performance of the network heuristic is summarized in Table 3. The true cost of procurement
over the network in any period is convex and piecewise linear with stochastic coefficients. As the
input price changes across locations become more correlated, the variability in the coefficients of
the convex, piecewise linear cost function decreases. Further, the salvage value across all locations
will also become closer as the correlation increases. Recall that the heuristic described in Section 3.1
approximates the multi-node network as an equivalent single node network with convex and piece-
wise linear costs, where the coefficients γjn are deterministic and given by equation (35). Thus, as
the correlation of input price changes across locations increases, the heuristic approximates the
network better and the performance of the network heuristic will be close to the performance of
the single node heuristic. In the limit with perfect correlation and zero transshipment cost, the
heuristic will be optimal when there is a single forward available for output sale commitments.
In fact, when the input price change correlations across all locations is varied from 0.95 to 0.98,
we found that the gap decreases to 9.02% (from 21.31%) for the five-node, 5 period problem. The
results in Table 4, for a two node network with three forward contracts and horizon length of 15
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Table 3 Performance of heuristic for network problem
# of Forwards L Horizon Two-Node Network Five-Node Network
(Maturity Dates {N`}) Length N Heuristic UB Gap Heuristic UB Gap
Value Value (Std. Error) Value Value (Std. Error)
1 5 10.53 11.30 6.76% 17.37 23.22 25.19%
{5} (7.89%) (7.74%)
2 10 42.67 47.83 10.80% 83.22 95.46 12.82%
{5,10} (4.20%) (4.31%)
3 15 85.67 96.30 11.04% 163.53 191.61 14.65%
{5,10,15} (3.54%) (3.58%)
4 20 148.49 167.77 11.49% 271.75 317.32 14.36%
{5,10,15,20} (2.95%) (3.18%)
Table 4 Sensitivity of heuristic to transshipment costs
Transshipment Heuristic UB Gap
Cost Value Value (Std. Error)
0 91.90 105.99 13.29%
(3.74%)
0.5 91.35 100.18 8.82%
(3.95%)
1 86.53 98.45 12.11%
(3.90%)
2 91.76 98.66 7.00 %
(3.99%)
3 89.54 100.31 10.73 %
(3.80%)
periods, also indicate that the network heuristic is fairly robust to changes in transshipment costs
and performs quite well even for high transshipment costs. Thus, the approximation of the convex
procurement cost function appears to have a much bigger impact on the performance than the
transshipment costs. Future improvements to the network heuristic could look at better ways to
approximate the input procurement cost and end of horizon salvage functions.
The policy computation times for the network heuristic are comparable to the those in the single
node case. Evaluating the upper bound in the network case however takes significantly longer. This
is not a concern for implementing the heuristic itself, because we need to compute the upper bound
only for a benchmark and not implementing the policy itself.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the integrated procurement, processing and trade decisions for
a firm dealing in commodities and subject to procurement and processing capacity constraints.
We solved the problem optimally and showed that the procurement and processing decisions in
any period are governed by inventory dependent thresholds and develop recursive expressions to
compute these thresholds. We also extended our results to incorporate convex, piecewise linear
costs of procurement and star networks; i.e., networks with a central processing node and multiple
procurement nodes connected to the processing node. We developed an efficient heuristic to solve
the single node problem when multiple forward contracts with different maturities are available to
sell the output. Additionally, for the network, we developed a heuristic based on approximating the
network as a single node, with piecewise linear convex cost of procurement. The numerical studies
indicate that the heuristic policies are near optimal, with the gap between the expected profits and
an upper bound on the optimal profits between 6%− 14% for most cases.
Our work lays the foundation for further research in commodity trading networks. The focus
of this paper has been on a single input that can be processed into a single output. In reality,
multiple output commodities may be produced upon processing the input; e.g., soybean is crushed
to produce soybean meal and oil, both of which are commodities that can be traded. The results
developed here extend to the case when multiple output commodities are produced upon processing.
We illustrate the case for the single node problem when two products are produced upon processing
the input, but the extension to more products and the network case is straightforward.
Multiple output products. Let one unit of input when processed yield αM units of product
M and (1−αM) units of product O, with 0 < αM < 1 (one could think of M and O to denote meal
and oil in ITC’s soybean commodity network). Let `m and `o index the forward contracts available
for output M and O respectively with maturity at N`m and N`o . Let M `mn and O`On be the forward
prices on these contracts. Further, let hM and hO be the unit holding cost per period for M and
O.
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After processing, the decision to commit commodity M or O for sale against a forward contract
can be made independent of the decision for the other commodity. Thus, similar to the single output
case, each unit of M and O is a compound exchange option on the remaining forward contracts
for that commodity and Lemma 1 holds for each commodity. Also, we can calculate the marginal
value of inventory for each output in a manner similar to the single output case. Define Φ(`m)N`m−1 and
∆(m)n , the marginal value of inventory for commodity M using the forward contracts and holding
cost for M . Define Φ(`o)N`o−1 and ∆
(o)
n similarly for O. The benefit from processing in period n is equal
to ∆n− p where ∆n = αM∆(m)n +(1−αM)∆(o)n in this case. The marginal value of input inventory
and the optimal procurement and processing decisions are then given by Theorem 1, with ∆n as
defined.
An obvious extension would be to consider a multi-product setting where the firm can choose
from different input commodities to procure and / or process the input into different output
commodities. The methodology and analysis used in this paper can be useful in analyzing more
general commodity processing and trading networks which include other operational constraints
such as transshipment capacities and stochastic transshipment costs among others. Extending the
research to incorporate these aspects could result in newer insights.
The focus of our paper is to determine integrated optimal policies for a risk-neutral firm. Firms
dealing in commodity markets are usually risk-averse, with limited appetite for taking on risk.
There is a substantial body of literature in the finance and economics streams concerning risk
management in commodity and financial markets, and the use of market instruments for managing
risk. The operations management literature concerning risk-aversion is fairly limited and focused
mostly on single period models; see for example, Eeckhoudt et al. (1995), Agrawal and Seshadri
(2000), Gaur and Seshadri (2005). Chen et al. (2007) is an exception, and considers a multiperiod
inventory problem for a risk-averse decision maker. The problem context for this paper provides
an opportunity to contribute to the literature on risk-aversion in a multiperiod problem. Thus,
an important extension to our present work would be to incorporate a firm’s risk aversion in the
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decision making explicitly and integrate the financial and operational decisions in a multiperiod
network setting.
Appendix A: Upper Bound Calculation
The upper bound computation along a sample path ΓN is given by
HUBN (eN ,QN ; ΓN) = SNeN









− zn(en, qn, xn,mn,ΓN)+βHUBn+1(en+1,Qn+1; ΓN)
}
for n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1
where the dual penalty is given by















Qn+1 for en+1 ∈ [(k− 1)D,kD)
Notice that the penalty function above is piecewise linear in en+1, with change in slopes at
integral multiples of D. Since the procurement and processing capacities are integral multiples of
D, we can solve the upper bound computation as a mixed-integer linear program, where the binary
integer variables identify the segment that en+1 lies in, for each n.
Specifically, (N − (n+1))a+1 is the maximum number of segments with different slopes in the
penalty function. Further, en+1 ∈ [0, nbD] always. Therefore, in period n we need min{nb, (N− (n+
1))a+1} binary variables to indicate which segment the ending input inventory lies in, in order to
compute the dual penalty value at the corresponding inventory level. Let
κ(n) = min{nb, (N − (n+1))a+1}
akn = kD for k = 0,1, . . . , κ(n)− 1 and aκ(n)n = nbD
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Following Sherali (2001), let ϕ(k,l)n and ϕ(k,r)n be continuous variables and ykn a binary variable for





kD + [λ̂kn+1−EÎn [λkn+1]]
for k = 1,2, . . . , κ(n), for n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1 and
z0n = 0 for n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1




























xn ≤K n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1
mn ≤C n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1
qn = 0 n 6= N`− 1 for `∈ {1,2, . . . ,L}
qn ≤Qn +mn n = N`− 1 for `∈ {1,2, . . . ,L}
Qn+1 = Qn +mn− qn n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1















n for k = 1,2, . . . , κ(n),
n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1
κ(n)∑
1
ykn = 1 for n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1
ykn ∈ {0,1} k = 0,1, . . . , κ(n),





n ≥ 0 n = 1,2, . . . ,N − 1
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The above problem can then be solved using a standard mixed-integer programming solver (we
used the CPLEX R© solver in our implementation).
Appendix B: Price Process Parameters for Numerical Studies
This section describes the parameters used for generating the results for the numerical studies
described in Sections 2.4 and 3.2. Specifically,
1. Table 5 gives the parameters underlying the dynamics of the input spot and output forward
price processes.
2. Table 6 gives the correlation matrix for the output commodity forward prices. These values
have been adapted from the correlation structure for natural gas forward contracts described in
Lai et al. (2009b).
3. Table 7 gives the correlation matrix for the output commodity forward prices and the input
commodity spot prices at each location.
4. Table 8 gives the correlation matrix for the input spot prices across locations.
Table 5 Input and Output Price Process Parameters












Table 6 Output Forward Price Correlation Matrix
Maturity
Maturity 5 10 15 20
5 1 0.958 0.933 0.91
10 1 0.983 0.959
15 1 0.982
20 1
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Table 7 Output Forward Price and Input Spot Price Correlation Matrix
Location
Maturity 1 2 3 4 5
5 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
10 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
15 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
20 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Table 8 Input Spot Price Correlation Matrix
Location
Location 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0.983 0.959 0.935 0.919
2 1 0.982 0.962 0.946




1. Technically, a greatest common divisor may not exist if either C or K is not a rational number.
We assume that both C and K are rational.
2. We should note that while this is true in general for ITC, there are instances when the firm
procures from the direct channel at a higher price, even if the price in the spot market is lower.
Because the firm has better control over the quality of the soybean procured in the direct channel,
however, the true marginal cost after adjusting for quality is still lower in the direct channel. Thus,
the total procurement cost is still convex.
3. This restriction on possible transshipment is also consistent with the actual features of the ITC
network, where a processing plant is supported by a set of procurement hubs, but transshipment
of soybean between the procurement hubs is very rarely observed.
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